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Introduction  
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“Gender-based violence is the most pervasive and least recognized human rights 
violation in Pakistan,” reads a manual distributed by the Sarsabz Foundation.1  According 
to Sarsabz, gender-based violence “has many forms and shades and is present across all 
strata.  Women are potential victims of violence at every stage of their lives.”2  
According to data gathered by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) in 
2010, violence against women is a key issue in the country.  Approximately 1,790 
women were murdered in 2010 and 1,076 of these women were killed by their husbands, 
fathers, brothers, sons, in-laws and other relatives.3  Not only are these significant 
numbers, but they also forgo the myriad of cases that are never reported or revealed 
publicly.  The HRCP’s report also makes it clear that violence can take many forms.  
Nonetheless, the most common type of violence against women in Pakistan is domestic 
violence, or violence executed by intimate partners.   
The findings of the Aurat Foundation, a frontrunner organization in Pakistan 
targeting issues affecting women, builds on the HRCP’s data.  Table 1 (see Appendix) 
displays the number of cases of violence against women from January through June of 
2011.4  The table also shows the form of violence and/or its result, as well as the location 
of the majority of the cases.5  
                                                        
1
 Sarsabz Foundation, “Strengthening Local Justice System through Integrated 
Legal Aid Services,” www.sarsabz.org.   
2
 Ibid.   
3
 “State of Human Rights in 2010.”  Annual Reports 2010, The Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan.  http://www.hrcp-web.org/Publications/AR2010.pdf. 
4
 The Aurat Foundation.  “Press Briefing:  Incidents of Violence Against Women in 
Pakistan Reported during January to June 2011.”  www.af.org.pk.   
5
 However, it is important to note that while the table depicts that the majority of the 
cases take place in the Punjab province, this does not imply that Punjab is somehow more 
violent than other provinces.  This is due only to the fact that that the Punjab province is 
the largest province in Pakistan with a total of 35 districts. 
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As this data indicates, violence against women is a widespread problem in 
Pakistan.  The aim of this thesis, then, is to understand violence against Pakistani women 
in light of Pakistan’s history as a nation, Pakistani women’s rights, and the relationship 
between Islam and the state.  I will argue that the phenomenon of violence against 
women in Pakistan has its foundations in the 1947 Partition and eventually came to be 
affixed to religion and condoned by the state through laws implemented under the banner 
of Islam.   
As such, Chapter Two will provide a general literature review of scholarly work 
on the topics of human rights, women’s rights, Islam, and violence against women in 
Pakistan.  Chapter Three provides historical background on women’s rights and 
movements in Pakistan in connection to its founding principles of democracy and gender 
equality. In Chapter Four, an in-depth case study of recent incidents of violence against 
women in Pakistan will be employed as the research method.  Chapter Five provides a 
concluding assessment of the larger meanings gleaned from the findings of this thesis. 
Method 
An explanation of method is in order to clarify the overall approach of this thesis 
to the research and data employed. This thesis, in Chapters Three and Four, utilizes 
secondary sources to provide historical and political analysis of violence against women 
in Pakistan.  The sources in use discuss the 1947 Partition of India, Pakistan’s subsequent 
political agenda and the role of women—as well as Islam—in each of the 
aforementioned.  In choosing to utilize the works of Ritu Menon, Kamla Bhasin, 
Filomena Critelli, Moon Charania, and Mumtaz and Shaheed—to name a few—the 
author aimed to make connections between the birth of Pakistan as an independent 
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nation, Islam, and the violence against women that is so prevalent today.  Much of the 
sources were compiled within the past ten years, and thus, are products of recent 
scholarship on topics such as:  women in Pakistani politics, women and rights in Islam, 
gender-based violence in Pakistan and, of course, women in the 1947 Partition of India.  ,   
This in-depth historical and political analysis of women’s rights and issues in Pakistan 
will illustrate how violence against women has been deeply affected by the policies 
pursued by those in office in Pakistan since 1947.   
In addition, Chapter Four’s case study method requires further explanation. A 
case study consists of detailed analysis the phenomenon being studied (i.e. violence 
against women in Pakistan) in an effort to make connections between the case being 
studied and other, larger underlying issues in affect.6  According to Bent Flyvbjerg, a 
case study is “an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person or community) 
stressing developmental factors in relation to environment.”7  In accepting the preceding 
definition, this chapter will present illustrative case studies of gender-based violence in 
Pakistan to answer the “how” and “why” of violence against women in Pakistan.  The 
incidents relayed are fairly recent, taking place within the last twelve years.  Beyond this 
commonality, every case has in it certain aspects that are not found in the others.   The 
purpose of choosing such cases is to highlight all the different aspects of violence against 
women and the situations under which it occurs.  
Many of the cases studied within this thesis are taken from the Sarsabz 
Foundation (SF)—a nongovernmental organization, located in the city of Faisalabad, 
                                                        
6
 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Case Study,” in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., 
The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, 4th Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA:  
Sage, 2011), 301.   
7
 Flyvbjerg, 301.   
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Pakistan, working to create a democratic and equalitarian society.8  SF utilizes 
qualitative, participatory and applied social research to produce evidentiary material on 
good governance, political participation, gender justice and social development.9  Hence, 
those case studies put forth in this thesis that have been acquired from SF are actual cases 
the organization has worked on and, subsequently, formulated into succinct summaries 
for use in data and funding.  Thus, Chapter Four further puts forth those case examples, 
along with an in-depth analysis of their links to the larger historical and political 
situations in which they emerge.  Further, in addition to the questions of “how” or “why,” 
this chapter aims at making connections between violence against women and the 
relationship between Islam and the state in Pakistan.  Consequently, each case will be 
analyzed in its minutiae to address the larger implications of such occurrences.  This 
analysis will address how and why the shifting dynamics between the sate and the 
religion have played a critical role in condoning violence against women.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8
 Sarsabz Foundation, “Capacity Statement,” ed. June 2011.  www.sarsabz.org.   
9
 Ibid.   
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Chapter II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature Review 
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It is not possible to discuss violence against women, particularly in Pakistan, 
without taking into account a myriad of contextual factors that highly influence the 
realities faced by women.  A growing body of scholarly work on the issue of violence 
against women in Pakistan has aimed to understand its characteristics, causes, and 
effects.   The following review of this literature will cover major works speaking most 
directly to the topics at hand. This review will begin with the broader field of universal 
human rights, then proceed to look into women and rights in Islam and Muslim countries, 
followed by historical foundations and violence against women in Pakistan, and finally 
works on the approach commonly used in addressing issues affecting Muslim women.   
As a Muslim country and signatory of the United Nations’ (UN) Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) and the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979), Pakistan is an interesting 
site for examining the application of human rights in Muslim countries.  Since Pakistan 
has signed the UDHR, it presumably pledges to uphold the tenets of the UDHR.  Also of 
concern is Pakistan’s history as a Muslim country that has on and off enacted laws 
purported to be “Islamic,” especially with respect to women.  In addition, violence 
against women—its foundations and the forms it takes– is also deeply embedded in this 
project.  As discussed previously, in order to understand why violence against women is 
so pervasive in Pakistan today, it is important to comprehend not only the foundations of 
this phenomenon, but the larger field of gender-based violence (GBV) in Pakistan.   
Universal Human Rights—Women’s Rights, and the Rights of Women in Islam 
The “universality” of human rights was established with the inception of the 
UDHR.  With the enactment of this declaration, for the first time, states were called upon 
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to unite in accepting and securing human rights. Many have sought to contest the idea 
that the contents of the UDHR are universal.  Indeed, there are outright opponents, 
staunch supporters and then those who fall in an all-together different category where 
supporters are able to look through a critical lens and advocate for change.  This call for 
revision truly came to head when the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979).  
Countries which ratified or ceded to the treaty were bound by international law to ensure 
the equality of men and women within their legal systems—while at the same time 
abolishing any laws discriminatory toward women—and create institutions that would 
maintain the policy of equal treatment.10  Consequently, scholars such as Sally Engle 
Merry, who falls in the latter category, argue that despite these advances of the United 
Nations and human rights law, violence against women is still widely prevalent 
throughout the world. 11   The problem, she argues, is a disjunction between what she 
calls the “legal” and the “local.”12  Implementation at the local level becomes faulty when 
human rights regulations, as put forth by documents like the UDHR and CEDAW, fail to 
translate into local terms and exist within the local framework.13   
Likewise, David Hollenbach argues that human rights, via the UDHR, are 
universal.  And, as some of these rights relate specifically to women, they can be dubbed 
“women’s rights.”  Furthermore, despite the differences in culture and religion, 
                                                        
10
 UN Women, “Convention on the Discrimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women,” http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm.  
11
 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence:  Translating 
International Law into Local Justice (London:  The University of Chicago Press, 
2006).   
12
 Merry, 1-35.   
13
 Ibid.   
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Hollenbach argues that most people can agree at least on upholding human dignity by 
refraining from oppressing, enslaving and starving people.14  Similar to Merry, he pushes 
for an understanding of religious and social-cultural norms and shaping strategies to suit 
a particular people.  International human rights law (and its subsequent application), as 
Merry writes, will be more effective when there is an understanding of the innate 
differences between peoples.   
One of these vital differences that cannot be overlooked is religion.  The debate 
on the implementation of human rights laws is overshadowed by the quite popular debate 
on the so-called “incompatibility” of human rights and Islam.  However, in looking at this 
very same perceived “clash” between religion and human rights, Javaid Rehman argues 
that the message of Islam is not, indeed, adverse to human rights.15  While the tenets of 
Islam may lead to inconclusiveness in this regard, Rehman argues, it is this very same 
ambiguity that allows for flexibility in the forging together of human rights and religion.  
According to Khaleel Mohammed, it is not that Islam necessarily lacks values adherent to 
human rights, but that the misinterpretations and misconceptions fail to acknowledge 
these values.16  Islam is not without its problems, and these problems will not go away 
unless there is change.  A major challenge cited by Mohammed is that those with the 
                                                        
14
 David Hollenbach S.J., “Human Rights and Women’s Rights,” in A Just and 
True Love:  Feminism at the Frontiers of Theological Ethics, Essays in Honor of 
Margaret A. Farley, edited by Maura A. Ryan and Brian F. Linnane (Notre Dame:  
University of Notre Dame Press:  2007), 60.   
15
 Javaid Rehman, “Conflicting Values or Misplaced Interpretations?  Examining 
the Inevitability of a Clash between ‘Religions and ‘Human Rights,” in Does God 
Believe in Human Rights? Essays on Religion and Human Rights, Eds. Nazila 
Ghanea, Alan Stephens and Raphael Walden  (Boston:  Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2001).   
16
 Khaleel Mohammad, “A Muslim Perspective on Human Rights,” Society, 
(January/February 2004).   
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authority to bring about this change will not take into consideration the works of female 
scholars such as Riffat Hassan and Asma Barlas whose voices are necessary for 
success.17 
Hassan and Barlas look specifically at women and rights in Islam.  In “Women’s 
Readings of the Quran,” Barlas argues that Islam considers women to be equal to men.18  
In its early days, Barlas writes, Islam provided women with rights and privileges equal to 
that of men.  Over the years, however, this Islam has changed from a religion of equality 
to one that was misogynistic.  And Muslim women were unable to combat the unjust 
treatment put upon them in the name of Islam because they did not have access to the 
tools necessary for critical analysis.19  Likewise, Hassan looks to the creation story of 
Adam and Eve to argue that there is no solid proof that one was created before the other, 
or that Eve was—as is accepted in the Judeo-Christian belief—solely responsible for “the 
Fall.”20  She further argues that because men and women were created equal by Allah, 
they cannot, in any way, become unequal over time.21 She notes a discrepancy between 
“Islamic ideals and Muslim practice.”22  Hence, those laws that were enacted under the 
cloak of “Islamization” in Muslim countries reinforced this supposed inequality and led 
to misogyny, are now being critically viewed by Muslim women as tools of oppression.  
Looking specifically at Pakistan, Hassan states that during the time of Pakistan’s 
                                                        
17
 Mohammed, 35.   
18
 Asma Barlas, “Women’s Readings of the Quran,” The Cambridge Companion to 
the Quran Ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 
2006).   
19
 Barlas, 260.   
20
 Riffat Hassan, “The Issue of Woman-Man Equality in the Islamic Tradition,” in 
Women’s and Men’s Liberation:  Testimonies of Spirit ed. Leonard Grob, Riffat 
Hassan and Haim Gordon (New York:  Greenwood Press, 1991).   
21
 Hassan, 70.   
22
 Hassan, 68.   
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“Islamization” in the late 1970s, not only was there the emergence of anti-women 
legislation, but misogynistic literature swept across the nation.23    
Pakistani Women Securing Human Rights 
Looking more closely at Pakistan, it is helpful to turn to the work of Filomena 
Critelli on the actions women’s groups (such as Dastak) are taking to address gender-
based violence (GBV) in their state.24  Critelli asserts that Pakistani women are not 
bystanders in the movement to end GBV, they are in the middle of the action, vying for 
change.  They are utilizing a human rights framework, she states, and it is one that takes 
into account their unique cultural, social and political realities.25  She concludes:   
Women’s organizations such as Dastak have played a critical role in the global 
effort to counter gender violence.  In Pakistan, their work is crucial given the 
absence of concerted governmental effort to document the prevalence of violence 
against women and lack of political will and appropriation of resources to address 
the issue.26   
Women activists in Pakistan are utilizing the principles of the UDHR and the CEDAW 
by shaping them to conform with their own ideals and beliefs and still gain the same 
result:  an end to GBV.   
Anna King, on the other hand, argues from a different perspective, but does come 
to the same conclusion—if in a roundabout way.  She states that Muslim feminists 
emerging from the Muslim world are embarking on a type of jihad against social 
                                                        
23
 Ibid.   
24
 Filomena Critelli, “Women’s Rights=Human Rights:  Pakistani Women against 
Gender Violence,” Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 37, no. 2 (2010).   
25
 Critelli, 136-137.   
26
 Critelli, 153.   
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injustice.27  Nonetheless, her premise is not in line with that of other scholars mentioned 
in this review, and her focus is not the women who are truly affecting the change, but the 
likes of Irshad Manji and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, both notorious for their sweeping anti-women 
presumptions about Islam.   
Violence against Women in Pakistan and its Foundations 
Studying another important historical backdrop for violence against Pakistani 
women, the work of Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin offers women’s perspectives on the 
Partition of 1947 and the foundations of gender violence.28  Their book Borders and 
Boundaries only strengthens Merry and Hollenbach’s premise with regard to knowing, 
and thus allowing, people to work in tandem with the particularities of their locale.  
Menon and Bhasin argue that in order to fully comprehend the complexities of the 
Partition—it is vital to examine the experiences of women.  Their feminist reading 
focuses as much—if not more—on the first hand accounts of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh 
women as it does on governmental documents and prior historical scholarship. They state 
that the violence which began with the mass migration of Muslims to Pakistan and 
Hindus and Sikhs to India sparked—above all else—gross violence against the “honor” 
of the male:  the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh female.  The best way to target and injure a 
man, Menon and Bhasin write, was to dishonor him via a female family member (wife, 
daughter, mother, sister, etc.).  In order to protect the honor of their families, thousands of 
women committed suicide, and families killed those who did not choose this route.29 
                                                        
27
 Anna King, “Islam, Women and Violence,” Feminist Theology 17, no. 3 (2009).   
28
 Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, Borders and Boundaries:  Women in India’s 
Partition (New Delhi:  Kali for Women and Women Unlimited, 2004).   
29
 This practice, inadvertently, giving rise to the “honor killings” of present day.  
Consequently, Dr. Riffat Hassan created The International Network for the Rights 
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Perhaps most significant to the premise of this thesis, however, is the connection Menon 
and Bhasin make between extreme forms of pre-Partition violence against women and the 
more commonplace abuse that women deal with on a more daily basis in today’s 
Pakistan.30  
Moving to the contemporary era, Zafar Hilaly finds that over sixty years after 
independence, at least eighty percent of Pakistani women experience domestic 
violence—while one in three is a victim of rape.31  This type of abuse is so commonplace 
Hilaly states, that Pakistan (as of June 2011) has been ranked 152 out of 156 countries on 
the gender empowerment measure.  Instead of observing a decrease in acts of violence 
against women in light of recent legislation protecting women, it is only becoming more 
widespread.  Critelli echoes Hilaly and links the pervasiveness of GBV to the absence of 
economic independence and empowerment.32 
It is this very same commonplace violence and abuse that Adeel Khan and Rafat 
Hussain—as well as Sarfraz Khan and Mirza Rizwan Sajid—elaborate upon in their 
respective pieces. Khan and Hussain state that a number of studies on violence against 
women in South Asia concur that violence is “associated with hierarchical and 
inequitable gender relations.”33  Similar to Menon and Bhasin, Khan and Hussain argue 
that there is a strong link between cultural beliefs and norms and domestic violence.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
of Female Victims of Violence in Pakistan in 1999 to establish a network in which 
to address and assist in ending this endemic 
(http://ecumene.org/INRFVVP/background.htm).  
30
 Menon and Bhasin, 40.   
31
 Zafar Hilaly, “The Dismal State of Women in Pakistan,” The Express Tribune, 
June 22, 2011.   
32
 Critelli, 242.   
33
 Adeel Khan and Rafat Hussain, “Violence against Women in Pakistan: 
Perceptions and Experiences of Domestic Violence,” Asian Studies Review 32 
(2008), 239.   
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They state that the cultural beliefs surrounding family honor are inexorably linked to the 
chastity of women, the custom of giving dowry, and discriminatory laws.  All of these 
factors come together to create an environment of structural disadvantage that is only 
aggravated by the state—further obfuscating the GBV problematic and making the 
victims of such violence more susceptible to it.34  Khan and Hussain conclude that 
domestic violence is an escalating problem that needs addressing at all levels.  Refusal at 
the state level only exacerbates the issue, reinforcing the reluctance many women feel 
about openly speaking about their situation.  
Khan and Sajid differ from Khan and Hussain in that they narrow the range of 
their project to look at rural cases.  Nonetheless, their proposition is very much the same.  
They argue that there are numerous factors to blame for the pervasiveness of domestic 
violence in Pakistan:  notions of male-superiority, government indifference, and the 
additional element of the joint-family system.35  Surprisingly, much of the violence 
against women within the home is propelled by in-laws.  As Khan and Hussain also point 
out, more often than not, the mother-in-law is responsible for second-handedly inflicting 
violence—thus perpetuating the cycle of violence.36  Women who have experienced 
domestic violence are later prone become indirect perpetrators.  Khan and Sajid further 
                                                        
34
 Khan and Hussain, 240.   
35
 Sarfraz Khan and Mirza Rizwan Sajid, “Violence Against Women in Pakistan:  A 
Case Study of Wife Battering in Rural Gujrat, Pakistan,” World Applied Sciences 
Journal 12, no. 11 (2011), 2168.   
36
 Ibid.   
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state that religion is also misused in an effort to justify violence in rural Gujrat.37  This 
aspect is not, however, limited to just that geographical location.38  
Approaching the topic of Violence Against Women:  Domestic Violence in Pakistan 
  Accordingly, in looking at issues affecting women, especially women in 
developing nations, it is vital to restrain from utilizing rhetoric that succeeds only in 
victimizing the female. This rhetoric is one in which the subject (in this case the Pakistani 
woman) ceases to be seen and accepted as an agent and hence evokes feelings of pity and 
cultural superiority in relation to the victimized “other.”  The author—while not claiming 
any expertise—hopes to exercise the utmost caution and care not to view Pakistani 
women as faceless, helpless beings or contribute to epistemological violence in the 
process of studying them.  
 
 
                                                        
37
 Khan and Sajid, 2169.   
38
 Violence against women—on a larger scale—in Muslim countries is often 
connected to Islam.  This is a baseless assumption.  Islam neither dictates nor 
promotes violence against females.  As Kamran Pasha writes:   “To those who 
know little about Islamic history, it may sound laughable to assert that Islam began 
as a proto-feminist movement. But it's true” (Kamran Pasha, “’Honor Killings’ and 
Islam,” The Huffington Post, February, 19, 2003, World Section).  Perhaps it was 
due to the myriad of rights denied to the women in Arabia at the time that one of 
the most important aspects of Islam came to be women’s rights.  As Islam entered 
into the picture, the foremost goal of the Prophet—and the very few number of 
people that had accepted Islam thus far—was to educate those who would listen on 
this subject.  “One of the first Arab practices he [Prophet Muhammad] outlawed 
was female infanticide.  Pre-Islamic Arab men would bury alive unwanted baby 
girls in the dessert, a horrific tradition that Prophet Muhammad ended forever.  
There is a powerful scene in the Holy Qur’an depicting Judgment Day where the 
souls of all the girls who were slain would rise and confront their fathers, asking the 
men:  ‘For what crime did you kill me?’  And then their fathers would be flung into 
Hell.  It is a vivid image meant to inculcate the true horror of such crimes…’” 
(Ibid.)     
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The Lasting Effects of Colonialism  
The phenomenon of victimizing women (or men) who are perceived to in some way be 
different than oneself (especially with regard to the East/West dichotomy) has its roots in 
colonialism.  Despite colonizers’ obvious physical withdrawal from their colonies in the 
twentieth century, the ideas and sentiments ensconced during that era still exist in certain 
scholarly writings.  The late Edward Said, in his renowned 1978 book Orientalism, 
articulated this sensation simply as neophyte explanations—by outsiders—of a particular 
region (in his case, the Middle East) shaped significantly by attitudes of imperialism.  
European imperialist attitudes included assumptions of cultural superiority and a strong 
belief in the need for “civilizing the uncivilized.”39 This concept was utilized to justify 
European imperialism in the 18th and 19th century, and was believed to have been 
abolished along with imperialism and colonialism.   However, the notion of other women 
as helpless and oppressed continues to appear in contemporary discourses about Muslim 
women: a Western desire to “help,” to aid the women, children, and minorities of such 
nations, and to secure their “rights.”    Indeed, there remains no shortage of Americans 
and Europeans wanting to “do their part,” “give back” and help these women escape their 
victimization from “behind the veil.” 
Western feminists, too, have fallen into this trap when it comes to women of 
developing nations.  Discussions of human rights violations—like the present topic of 
violence against women in Pakistan—have led many United States scholars and feminists 
to call upon the government to take definitive action in assisting third-world women.  In 
critically analyzing the reasons behind the U.S occupation of Afghanistan, Charles 
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Hirshkind and Saba Mahmood write of U.S feminist organizations as early as 1999 
embarking on a mission to “save third-world women.”40  It was, perhaps, one of the very 
rare times all different groups—feminists, Republicans, Democrats, and the military—
came together to unite in one cause:  saving the Afghani women from the burqa enforcing 
Taliban.41  The overt mission of Operation Enduring Freedom was to get Afghani women 
literally and figuratively to lift the veil and come out into society.  Nonetheless, the 
mission failed because many women did not want to remove the burqa as it was an article 
of clothing worn by women in the region.  What did alter drastically upon U.S occupation 
was the decrease and, eventually, outright halt in the availability of necessities (i.e. food, 
clothing, etc.) for women and children.  Most ironic, however, was the spike in violence 
against women.  Where women were once safe to leave their homes without the fear of 
harassment and/or rape, they were no longer able to do so.  Much of this situation 
resulted from the fact that the U.S felt secure that its involvement was the best thing for 
Afghan women.42  
Likewise, Laila Lalami writes about the pitying feelings Muslim women inspire in 
Western hearts.  This concern, she argues, is reserved solely for Muslim women and their 
“plight,” never for Christian or Jewish women residing under the same circumstances.  
Further, as Lalami argues, this type of behavior is too often greeted with wary and 
outright suspicious responses in the Muslim world.  Muslim women have become 
enigmas, never ceasing to puzzle because of their failure to seek assistance.  Lalami 
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writes that it is difficult for Western thinkers to fathom why Muslim women do not look 
to the West for help in subverting all forms of “backward” thinking.43 
Like Lalami, Shabana Mir asserts that not only do Muslim women not need 
saving, but they themselves have been taking risks in some ways far surpassing those of 
their Western counterparts for quite some time.44  While indifference to their situation is 
not the answer, Mir argues that commandeering will not and cannot work.  Contrary to 
popular belief, Muslim women know what is best for themselves; Mir urges humility and 
an acceptance of solutions that do not always come from this part of the world. Lila Abu-
Lughod echoes these sentiments, arguing that there is no need to “save” because this can 
only lead to more violence and feelings of superiority.45  By falling subject to this type of 
thinking, Muslim women fail to be accepted as equals and are viewed as less than.  
Likewise, the breadth of work surrounding the topics of women’s rights (within 
human rights) and in Islam, violence against women and, more specifically, violence 
against women in Pakistan is quite large.  Needless to say, gender violence is a global 
problem, prevalent not only in the Third World, but the First World as well.  It is a 
mistake to assume that in the case of Pakistan, such violence is uniquely widespread 
solely due to religion (as is often the assumption with Muslim countries).  This is a gross 
over-simplification of the issue and completely overlooks the relationship between Islam 
and other root causes, as well as the diversity and flexibility of Islamic thought.   
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Thus, the study at hand will approach the issue of violence against women in 
Pakistan with the understanding and belief that Pakistani women have themselves been 
working actively to put an end to all forms of violence against women.  Further, this 
thesis does not endeavor to provide solutions.  Utilizing an approach encompassing the 
arguments discussed above, the author aims to contextually analyze the phenomenon of 
violence against women: its historical foundations, its causes and its effects.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
History and Background 
  
 27
The history of Pakistan is essential to fully comprehending the issue of violence 
against women in Pakistan. According to Human Rights Watch, some 70 to 95% of 
women in Pakistan experience domestic violence, and such rates of frequency do not 
surface overnight. 46   Violence against women has its roots in the tumultuous time 
before, during, and after the birth of Pakistan.  Likewise, the 1947 Partition of India 
(resulting in the creation of Pakistan as a state for Muslims) as well as the lasting effects 
of the country’s experience of colonialism have played a pivotal role in how Pakistan has 
defined Islam in its legal and political spheres, especially with regard to women.  
Pre-Pakistan 
According to Imran Munir, the partition of India in 1947 “was one of the 
bloodiest upheavals in human history, during which more than 10 million people 
crossed the border between India and Pakistan, and more than 200,000 were butchered 
on both sides of the divide.”47  People were on the move as early as 1946, and 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah—then leader of the All-India Muslim League—urged the 
prudency of devising “some mechanism for their smooth and safe transit.”48  However, 
nothing of the sort was constructed.  Indeed, as Yasmin Khan argues,  “partition was 
loftily imposed from above.”49  British leadership went forth with plans to divide the 
nation without thought to how such a plan would be carried out, or what affect it would 
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have on citizens.  No one person from the British envoy—namely Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, last British viceroy of India—stopped to really ponder how such a great 
divide could be implemented in the best way.  Mountbatten announced on June 3, 1947 
that the British would hand over power to the new Pakistani and Indian leadership in a 
mere six weeks.50  This announcement created frenzy amongst the people.  There was 
confusion about where the country was to be divided, where the borders would lie and, 
most importantly, where people were to go. Not surprisingly, clarification came slowly, 
resulting in mass violence in the ensuing chaos. Power was transferred too quickly and 
the process was not at all well thought out.51    
The Partition also came with certain inequalities between India and Pakistan. 
The border was only one of the many areas that would fall in India’s favor; more fertile 
land was to remain Indian Territory, whereas the less irrigable portion was allotted to 
Pakistan.  One Pakistani official recalled:  “State property was divided and a rule of 
thumb agreed, by which 80 per cent [of land] went to India and 20 per cent to 
Pakistan.”52   The army, too, was never equally divided and India inherited the highly 
trained British Indian Army.  Indeed, the Partition did not leave Pakistan the tools on 
which to build a prosperous nation.  Consequently, aside from an independent Muslim 
state, Pakistan had few benefits to offer its new citizens.    
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Radha Kumar writes:  “Partition…has its own sordid history, not arising as a 
means of realizing national self-determination, but imposed as a way for outside powers 
to unshoulder colonies or divide up spheres of influence—a strategy of divide and quit.”53  
In the case of Pakistan, the “strategy of divide and quit” was more a strategy of divide in 
favor of India, and then quit.  The British were known, in all of their colonies, to utilize a 
tactic of favoritism.  This worked very well in creating divides amongst the colonized, as 
was the case in India.  The effects of being colonized alone are resounding; the effects of 
being the “lesser” of those being colonized are even greater.  Those Muslims who 
became a part of the newly minted nation of Pakistan were carrying with them 
aftereffects of this strategy.    
It is to these consequences of British colonialism that Moon Charania attributes 
Pakistanis’ mobilization of Muslim identity. Charania writes:   
The increased presence of Islam in the cultural context of Pakistan can be first 
attributed to the repercussion of colonization. In trying to overcome the cultural 
dislocation experienced under colonial rule, former colonial states are in the 
process of reasserting their ‘own’ identities and cultures.54   
In the case of Pakistan this “reassertion” focused on Islam, resulting in particular 
consequences for Pakistani women, as discourse on the status and rights of women in 
Pakistan has always invoked Islam.   
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Pakistan as a State 
 As it stands today, Pakistan is bordered by China on the north, India on the east, 
and Afghanistan and Iran on the west.  It encompasses four provinces:  Punjab, Sindh, 
North West Frontier Province and Balochistan—in addition to the Federally 
Administered Tribal and Northern Areas and Azad Jammu and Kashmir.  There are 
approximately seven different ethnic groups existing within Pakistan:  Punjabi, Sindhi, 
Pashtun, Baloch, Muhajir, Saraiki, and Hazara.55  Figure 1 (see Appendix) illustrates the 
geographic location of the aforementioned groups in Pakistan.  Ninety-seven percent of 
Pakistan’s citizens are Muslims.  Of those, 77% are Sunni and 20% are Shia.  The 
remaining 3% consist equally of Hindus, Christians and other religions.56   
 Despite the fact that Pakistan has been predominantly Muslim since its inception, 
and that it was a nation “created” for Muslims, the mantra of its founding leader, Jinnah, 
was to build a nation that was both secular and democratic.   He envisioned a nation that 
would be a safe haven for all its citizens, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, one that would 
be a “forward-thinking modern secular nation-state.”57  Muhammad Ali Jinnah asserted 
that the citizens of Pakistan were free to choose their faith and places of worship, as these 
choices were to be completely separate from the affairs of the state.58   
 According to Akbar Ahmed,  “Jinnah envisaged a country that would foster 
human rights, women’s rights, minority rights and the rule of law.”59  Prior even to the 
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creation of Pakistan itself, Jinnah was known to be quite vocal in this regard.  He was a 
firm believer in securing rights for minorities:  “It is a crime against humanity” Jinnah 
stated in 1944, “that our women are shut up within four walls as prisoners.  There is no 
sanction anywhere for the deplorable conditions in which our women have to live.  You 
should take your women along with you as comrades in every sphere of life.”60 During 
Jinnah’s time, not everyone was ready to accept his vision and goals for Pakistan.  The 
nation was divided both literally (East and West Pakistan) and figuratively (some in 
Pakistan were never in favor of the division because of their support for a united India 
under Gandhi and consequent opposition to Jinnah’s leadership).  Much of Jinnah’s time 
was spent appeasing dissidents in different provinces.61  Instead of paving the road to the 
prosperous future he so wanted for Pakistan, Jinnah was forced to travel from region to 
region urging citizens to realize that they all shared a common goal and that uniformity 
was necessary for success.  His cries landed on deaf ears, and before he could make any 
progress—Jinnah was gone.  On September 11, 1948, only a short time after gaining the 
much-coveted independence, Jinnah passed away, leaving the newborn country in 
disarray.62 
Pakistani Women and the Push for Equality 
 A few months later, Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly produced the “Objectives 
Resolution" stating “the future constitution of Pakistan was to be based on principles of 
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democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam.”63  
Discourse began on what would constitute the “role” of Islam, and subsequently, the 
“acceptable” place for women within society.  This debate garnered public attention and 
came to the forefront in 1955 when then Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra took a 
second wife.  Reactions varied amongst the elite women of Pakistan.  Organizations such 
as the All Pakistan Women’s Association (APWA), the women’s branch of Anjuman-e-
Taraqqi-e-Urdu, and the League for the Rights of Women (which was formed solely in 
response to Bogra’s polygamous marriage) rallied stalwartly on behalf of the “first 
wives” of Pakistan.  Likewise, women in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) pushed 
for a complete abolition of the practice while their counterparts in Lahore and Quetta 
took to the media to vocalize their vehement displeasure 64 In response to these mass 
protests, the prime minister publicly announced that his first wife would continue to 
receive equal treatment and was free to act in her own best interest.  He also stated that a 
commission would be formed focusing solely on reforming Pakistan’s marriage and 
family laws.65 
As Sarah Ansari argues, polygamy was not a common practice of Pakistanis at 
that time.  Still, it fell within the murky waters between “state” and “religion,” and 
questions arose regarding its jurisdiction.  Bogra’s polygamous marriage became the 
“pole” around which Pakistani women rallied.  This incident had an over-arching impact, 
raising key questions such as: What were the rights of Pakistani women?  Should the 
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state define marriage and family laws, or Islam?  Ultimately, Pakistani state law would go 
on to define Islam in very rigid and narrow terms, reflecting the ideology of those in 
office at the time.  
Pakistan’s first true constitution was enacted in 1956.  Unlike other nations where 
women struggled to obtain the vote, Pakistani women held it from the start.  Female 
participation in the Constituent and legislative assemblies was also quite unique.  While 
these women were, indeed, from well-established, elite political families, their work and 
successes benefited all Pakistani women.  The two female members of the Constituent 
Assembly (Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz and Begum Shaista Ikramullah) had strongly 
pushed to secure the 1948 Shariat Bill.66  Organizations like APWA also lobbied for the 
Shariat Bill to recognize the right of females to inherit all forms of property.67   
However, women’s struggle to secure equal footing was ongoing.  Pakistani 
women’s organizations strove for greater access to education for females, as well as more 
involvement in the political sphere.  Throughout all this, their focus remained on the 
restructuring of Pakistan’s marriage and family laws, in which respect they saw only 
minute progress.  The Rashid Commission report of June 1956 (authorized by Bogra), 
advised the creation of special courts to deal with matters of matrimony, promoted gender 
equality in divorce and recommended that second marriages were only allowed with 
official consent.68  To many, only the outright abolishment of polygamy was equitable to 
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success, but others applauded this accomplishment and looked toward what they 
presumed would be a brighter future.   
Some have called those early years the “golden age” of women in Pakistan.  Not 
only were the organizations catering to women’s issues and rights quite active and 
vocal, but the principles on which Pakistan was founded were still fresh in the minds of 
leadership:  a secular, democratic nation in which everyone would remain equal and 
human rights upheld at all times. It may sound strange to assert that a nation could 
strive to be both secular and democratic when it was created solely for the followers of 
a specific religion (i.e. Islam), yet this was the goal Jinnah had hoped to accomplish.  
Pakistan, he proposed, would be a secular Muslim country where Islam would be the 
official religion, but where other faiths could be practiced openly and without fear.  The 
implementation of democratic institutions would, in his belief, pave the way toward 
such secularity and tolerance.   
Nonetheless, these expectations met with disappointment when General Ayub 
Khan took over as President in Pakistan’s first military coup d’état and ended civilian 
rule within the country.  And yet, despite the method of his gaining office, Khan 
proceeded to surprise the body politic by speaking and acting on democratic principles.  
He did, indeed, attempt to combat the already rampant corruption in Pakistani 
government, as well as put forth the much-discussed Muslim Family Law Ordinance 
(MFLO)—which would legally amend any such laws (i.e. polygamy) which did not 
grant equality to both sexes.  Nonetheless, Khan’s reform—in the form of the MFLO—
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met with opposition from Pakistan’s religious scholars and conservatives groups and 
failed to pass legislation.69 
Khan’s MFLO would become the target of more backlash during General Zia-
ul-Haq’s “Islamization” some years later.  While the Pakistani constitutions of 1962 and 
1973 did call for the creation of a Council of Islamic Ideology to ascertain that all laws 
were conforming to Islam, none valued this decree more than the military regime of 
Zia-ul-Haq.  Zia-ul-Haq came to office via a military coup on July 5, 1977 and became 
Pakistan’s third military president in only 30 years.70  Most notable about his time in 
office was the introduction and implementation of Islamic Sharia Law in to Pakistan’s 
existing civil, criminal and family law.  His “Islamization” program was the direct 
result of his alliances with the ulama (religious scholars) who adhered to a strict 
interpretation of Islam.  Needless to say, Zia-ul-Haq’s acquaintances had a large 
influence in the laws he wished to implement and the way he chose to run the country.  
During his tenure in office, Zia-ul-Haq provided troops for the protection of the Saudi 
Royal family (the country which, consequently, gave birth to the strict and at times 
extreme sect of Wahabism within Islam) in return for their economic assistance.  He 
likewise channeled approximately two million dollars in covert American aid to anti-
Communist fighters in Afghanistan and opened Pakistan’s borders to radical forces that 
would assist in fighting America’s war against Soviet communists under the banner of 
Islam.71   
                                                        
69
 Ansari, 1460.   
70
 Ziring, 160.  
71
 Husain Haqqani, “’Weeding Out the Heretics:’ Sectarianism in Pakistan” in 
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 4 (2006).   
 36
Zia-ul-Haq’s motivation for enacting the Hudood ordinance was to make 
existing Pakistani laws conform to a strict interpretation of Islam.  The most 
controversial inclusion within the Hudood Ordinance was the Zina Ordinance.  The 
Zina Ordinance stated that illicit sex would now be a crime punishable by the state.   
Under the terms of the new law, accusations of rape without witnesses and/or viable 
evidence were accepted as admittance of the crime of adultery (for married women) or 
illicit consensual sex (for single women).72  Further, the Zina Ordinance called for the 
former to be punishable by death via stoning and the latter by 100 lashes.   
In crafting the ordinance, Zia-ul-Haq refused to discuss alternative 
interpretations of Islamic law.  Shahnaz Khan notes:  “When questioned as to how 
differing interpretations of Islam would be handled within his Islamization program he 
replied, ‘We are not getting into that debate.  We are going to the basic laws [in] Qur’an 
and Sunnah.  We are not going into various schools of thought.’”73  As Khan argues, 
Zia-ul-Haq thus failed to examine, utilize, or demonstrate the complexities of Islamic 
tradition and law in his refusal to glance beyond “fundamentals” of Islam.74  
 Garnering a great deal of attention from Western media and human rights 
organizations, the Zina Ordinance has profoundly impacted Pakistani society, 
particularly women, who have been incarcerated at extraordinarily high rates as a result 
of this law.  The Hudood Ordinance was amended in 2006 under the regime of General 
Pervez Musharraf, when Pakistan’s General Assembly passed the Protection of Women 
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Act (PWA).  This act holds that rape and/or adultery will be prosecuted under Pakistani 
civil law instead of Islamic Sharia Law.  Human rights activists, led by Asma Jahangir 
of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, were stalwart supporters of the PWA.  
Activists had been pushing for this amendment since 1979, but the end result came as a 
disappointment to some.  That reporting rape without witnesses would no longer 
constitute a crime was a step in the right direction, but Pakistani women wanted more.  
They wanted to see a Pakistan completely free of the Hudood Ordinance.75 
Consequently, as recently as 2010, Pakistan has put into effect the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act of 2010, as well as The Protection against Harassment of Women at 
the Workplace Act of 2010.76  The goal of both laws is to get more women into the 
work force by creating a safer, problem-free workplace.   
The Positive Effects of Female Contribution 
The history of Pakistan is unique in that women were a fundamental part of the 
nation-building process.  The pertinent issues affecting women, as well as their rights as 
Pakistani citizens, were never forgone in an effort to first build the nation itself; to the 
contrary they were central to national discussion since Pakistan’s inception.  Prior even 
to the creation of Pakistan Jinnah was noted as saying “no nation [could] make progress 
without the co-operation of its women”77 This idea was honored in the creation of the 
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Women’s Relief Committee by Jinnah’s sister Fatima, which later gave way to APWA.  
Similarly, the aforementioned Begum Shaista Ikramullah (first female member of 
Pakistan’s 1st Constituent Assembly) and Begum Rana Liaquat Ali Khan (activist and 
founder of the All Pakistan Women’s Association) were all instrumental in creating a 
voice for women in Pakistan. 
In its elementary years, Pakistan was perceived by the majority of Pakistanis to 
rise from the ashes left behind by Partition as a nation securely bound by the unwavering 
principle of gender equality. Nonetheless, those early years were followed by growing 
confusion over the intricate relationship between the nation, Islam and women. Still, in 
understanding violence against women in light of Pakistan’s history as a nation and 
Pakistani women’s rights, the author asserts that such violence has its roots in the 
Partition of 1947 and, overtime, came to be associated with religion and pardoned by the 
state via laws enacted under the guise of Islam.  
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Historical Foundations of Violence against Women in Pakistan 
In “Daughters of Eve:  Violence Against Women in Pakistan,” Muhammad 
Jehanzeb Noor writes:  “For centuries, many Pakistani women have been slaves to social 
and cultural restrictions that are reflective of gender-based injustices in the region.”78  
Violence against Pakistani women must be understood in light of “cultural and 
psychological factors” as well as deep-rooted prejudices that give rise to extreme 
brutality toward women.79 As Menon and Bhasin argue, the gross violence against 
women during Partition slowly gave way to the more mundane violence of today.80  The 
division of India and the horrid incidents that ensued in its aftermath brought to bear the 
issue of female ownership and sexuality.  The concept of male honor was (and is) equated 
to female ownership.  This very same notion led to extreme sexual violence against 
women.81  Viewed not as individuals in there own right but as the property of males, 
women became easy targets for violence. As Noor argues, “specific forms of family and 
kinship and a strong ideology linking family honour to female virtue allow men to control 
women.”82  During Partition, sexual assault became the weapon of choice and women 
were raped, mutilated, disfigured, and tattooed or branded “with triumphal slogans” on 
their genitalia, as well as subjected to inhumane cruelty all around.83  Needless to say, 
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many forms of violence against women in Pakistani society today stem from such scenes 
of the Partition.   
Amongst the pillaging, rape and murder was the kidnapping.  The exact numbers 
of women who were kidnapped and reported missing are debatable, but, after the fact, it 
became an issue of “national honor” for each side (India and Pakistan) to secure the 
women.  In Life and Words:  Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary, Veena Das 
extrapolates:  “Taken at face value it would appear that the norms of honor in the order of 
the family and the order of the state were mutually supportive.”84 Even the return of the 
women to their respective nations was a transaction conducted between men; to abstain 
or withhold women was to strike against the honor their families.85   
During the first eight months (December 1947-July 1948) of an initiative to find 
missing women, 9,362 women were recovered in India and 5,510 in Pakistan.86  Still, 
despite returning, women on both sides of the border were not safe from the stigma 
attached to their prolonged absence.  The idea that they were sullied having been out of 
their homes and away from the protection of male family members was such a deeply 
embedded belief that many women chose either to not return or end their lives to uphold 
the sacred value of familial honor.87   
In understanding the birth of Pakistan as a nation and the events of the Partition, 
the foundations of violence against women become more apparent.88 The analysis of the 
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cases provided below will draw out the connections between violence against women and 
this larger historical context.   
Case # 1:  Samia 
Perhaps the most well-known honor killing in Pakistan was that of twenty-seven 
year old Samia Sarwar.  Samia was shot to death in the office of her attorney, another 
prominent Pakistani human rights lawyer and activist Hina Jilani, for attempting to seek a 
divorce.  For six years Samia had suffered domestic violence in silence, ultimately 
deciding to end her marriage when her husband threw her down the stairs while she was 
pregnant with their second child.89  She returned to her parents’ home and notified them 
of her decision, only to be told they would kill her.  Indeed, on April 6, 1999 Samia’s 
mother stormed inside Ms. Jilani’s office with two armed men and had her daughter 
shot.90   
Case # 1 Analysis: 
 There is a stigma attached to divorce.  To suffer silently as a victim of domestic 
violence is better than to speak out or seek divorce.  Victims of domestic violence most 
often do not speak out—habitually carrying the shame and failure associated with such 
situations as their own burden.  However, the stigma against “failure” (connected to the 
female) in intimate gender relationships is one found to be pervasive in all patriarchal 
societies.  In discussing gender inequality and wife abuse in Palestine, Muhammad M. 
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Haj-Yahia, utilizes M. A. Straus’ framework on defining patriarchy.91  Haj-Yahia argues 
that an eight-part conceptual framework applies indiscriminately to all patriarchal 
societies.9293  In Samia’s case seven of these concepts are applicable:  
1. Protecting the authority of men: society granting less resources to Samia in terms 
of getting out of her abusive relationship, and more power and resources to her 
husband. 
2. Compulsive masculinity:  Samia’s husband, consequently, learned from a young 
age on how to “correctly” behave and preserve his masculinity.  Physical abuse 
became a part of this compulsive masculinity.   
3. Economic constraints and discrimination against women:  Samia’s dependency on 
her husband and family was due to lack of employment resources available to 
women in and out of the family.  This further hindered any steps she may have 
taken to remove herself from the abusive situation. 
4. Women bear the burden of child rearing: Samia had two young children to 
consider in her situation—with little to no financial assistance on childcare should 
she have sought it.  This reinforced the belief that the male is the provider for the 
family and the female the caretaker.  Without the provider, then, it was accepted 
that adequate care could not be given 
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5. The single-parent family myth and the negative attitude to divorce:  Samia’s 
greatest fear could, perhaps, have been of ostracism from society.  Her situation 
would come to be seen as her own doing—not her husband’s.  Similar to number 
4, there is the additional belief that life without a male would be one of poverty.    
6. Traditional views about the female role as mother and wife:  belief that because 
Samia was seeking to end her marriage, she was unsuccessful.   A strong presence 
of the idea that women can only attain successful status by becoming wives and 
mothers; leading to negative attitudes toward women who forgo family life to 
work, and/or aim to balance work and family.   
7. Negative self-image:  Samia was likewise subject to the innate belief in society—
passed on from a young age—that she cannot amount to the same status as, for 
example, her husband.  That she was, some how, less than and, therefore, the one 
to bear the blame. 94   
Thus, when looking at Samia’s case—as well as all the subsequent ones to be discussed 
later in the chapter—this framework can be applied to help paint a picture of the society 
in which the cases are occurring.  The fact that Samia herself was subjected to abuse for a 
number of years was not a cause for uproar, but the idea that she was trying to obtain a 
divorce was worthy of murder.  The negative attitude toward divorce is apparent in this 
case: women bear the blame of being unable to keep their home intact.  Samia’s 
husband’s behavior was never called into question by her family.  In the eyes of her 
family, Samia was the culprit in the dissolution of her marriage in seeking to obtain a 
divorce.  While they may have accepted that her husband was abusive, this 
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acknowledgement was overshadowed by deeply embedded societal views on familial 
honor.   
Case # 2:  Mukhtar Mai 
The 2002 gang rape of Mukhtar Mai is also comparable to Samia’s case.  Mai’s 
brother was falsely accused of having illicit sex with a woman from a tribe of higher 
status.  Mukhtar’s rape was ordered as punishment for her twelve-year-old brother’s 
alleged crime.  Mai was raped and then paraded around the village, this action sending 
out the message that women’s bodies are sites of honor.  The norm for young girls, after 
such incidents, was committing suicide to preserve what little was left of the family’s 
honor.  Mai, however, with the assistance of her family and the visiting imam came 
forward to report the atrocious crime.95  Her case went to court and many—if not all—of 
her attackers were brought to justice.   
Case # 2 Analysis:   
 Prior to the rape, Mai’s attackers justified their actions by stating, for the entire 
village to hear, that justice could only be upheld via the concept of “an eye for an eye.”  
Thus, no one questioned the vigilante justice that took place in the village that night.  
Firstly, civil law was not involved and the claims against Mai’s twelve-year-old brother 
were accepted as is without any evidence.  Also, there was no questioning as to why Mai 
would have to pay for her brother’s crime if, indeed, he had commit said crime.  
Mai’s case garnered media attention and slowly came to define Pakistani attitude 
toward women.  Despite the fact that much, if not all, of Pakistan’s population was 
enraged on Mai’s behalf, outside observers began to look at Pakistan as a place strongly 
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disconnected with reality and morality.  Those who were determined to look into the root 
of the case noticed that crucial factors, such as lack of general education (Pakistan’s total 
adult literacy rate is little over half at 54%) and awareness about the law and judicial 
system were at play.96 
Additionally, due to the lack of police presence, i.e., the presence of civil law, in 
Mai’s Southern Punjab village of Meerwala, no one questioned the carrying out of 
“justice.”  Further, following the media frenzy this case caused, many people began to 
question if such vigilante justice was endemic to Pakistan and rooted in Islam.     
Case # 3:  Tasleem Solangi 
The case of seventeen-year-old Tasleem Solangi also bears mentioning.  Solangi, 
the daughter of a livestock trader in the Khairpur District of Sindh, agreed to forgo her 
dreams of becoming a doctor and, instead, marry her cousin.  It was hoped that the 
marriage would settle the land dispute between two branches of her family.  When 
Tasleem’s father-in-law came to take her to her home, he swore on the Quran that she 
would not be harmed.  A month into the marriage, Tasleem secreted a note to her mother 
stating that she (her mother) was right to have dissuaded her from this marriage.  Tasleem 
wrote she was fearful for her life.  On March 7, 2008, when Tasleem was eight months 
pregnant, her father-in-law accused her of adultery and claimed that the baby was not his 
son’s.  Tasleem went into labor and immediately upon the baby’s arrival; dogs were 
unleashed upon the infant.  While she begged for mercy, the dogs were unleashed on her 
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as well.  She was ultimately shot dead.97  After being charged and awaiting trial, 
Tasleem’s husband finally confessed to her murder.98 
Case # 3 Analysis:   
 This case is one that highlights deeply embedded mistrust toward women.    
Tasleem’s father-in-law was adamant in his belief that the child was not his son’s.  
Despite her endless assurances of fidelity, both husband and father-in-law did not deem 
her worthy of such honesty.  Ingrained within them was the idea that women are less in 
character and, thus, not to be trusted.  Her acceptance of the marriage to quell any 
disruptions regarding family land, despite the fact that she had other aspirations for her 
life, failed to be seen and accepted as characteristics of a strong and loyal woman.  She 
was labeled as an adulterer, and nothing she could say would redeem her because she was 
born a female, and as such, could amount to no better.  One can only speculate on the 
rationale of Tasleem’s father-in-law in killing her.  Via the Hudood laws in Pakistan, 
women who come forth to report rape and those who are accused of adultery are often 
subject to incarceration or stoning.  As discussed in Chapter Two, in enacting the Hudood 
Laws, Zia-ul-Haq paved the way for the emergence of blatant gender discrimination as 
well as gave rise to violence against women without fear of prosecution.   
Case # 4:  The Women of Baba Kot  
Five women from Baluchistan were buried alive in Baba Kot village.  Three of 
the women were young and hoping to marry men they had selected themselves, and the 
two others were older and attempting to provide assistance.  Police stated that the brother 
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of two of the young women admitted to shooting three and then helping bury all five 
though none were dead.99  
Case # 4 Analysis:   
As observed across diverse Muslim contexts, a variety of interpretations of 
Islamic law frequently grant to both men and women the right to choose a spouse.  
Pakistani law, too, states that citizens have a right to marry a person of their choosing.  
Unfortunately, some purport to abide by the former or latter, but fail in adhering to either. 
Consequently, the underlying sentiments existent within this case are similar to that of 
those mentioned previously:  the justification of murder for the sake of protecting family 
honor, and the idea that women are not correctly practicing their religion.  Both 
sentiments again signal a lack of education and/or resources to obtain that education.100 
When making note of cases such as this one of the women of Baba Kot village, one is 
again forced to contend with the effects of narrowly defined interpretations of Islam.   
Case # 5:  Madeeha 
Likewise, Madeeha101 had been betrothed since childhood to a boy named 
Haroon.102  As she reached maturity, her parents exercised a change of heart and decided 
to get Madeeha married to a man many years her senior.  Despite her numerous refusals 
to accept the impending marriage, Madeeha’s parents went forth with their plans in hopes 
to make a financial gain.  Throughout all this, Madeeha’s cries of protest landed on deaf 
ears; in her desperation to marry her original betrothed, she did so by eloping with him. 
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Madeeha’s father, brother, and other male relatives then came to her new home and 
physically abused her to such an extent that her clothing was shred.  Again and again they 
attempted to make her renounce her marriage and take her back home with them.  
Madeeha refused and sought protection from their attacks.  A paralegal working with the 
Sarsabz Foundation (SF) referred Madeeha to a free legal aid clinic in Samundari, 
Pakistan where an SF coordinator convinced Madeeha that SF would assist her in 
attaining freedom from this threat.  A subsequent complaint was filed and the police 
intervened to assure that Madeeha would not have to experience any further 
harassment.103   
Case # 5 Analysis:   
Madeeha’s case was unique in that she was able to obtain assistance from the 
judicial system.  As it happened, the state and the religion were in harmony regarding the 
particulars of Madeeha’s situation, though this is often not the case with other women. 
Nonetheless, prior to SF’s involvement on the case, Madeeha was not making much 
leeway.  As is often the case with female victims of violence, the police force failed to 
take adequate action.  However, by joining Madeeha in her fight, SF was able to provide 
more manpower and thus, gain results.  Were Madeeha to have stood alone, as many 
women do due to lack of awareness regarding the resources that are available to them, 
she would have been pressured to pay her way for law enforcement assistance.  This 
phenomenon will be further discussed toward the conclusion of the present chapter.   
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Case # 6:  Sadia 
Indeed, the aforementioned facts and statistics are accentuated by the story of a 
young woman named Sadia.104  In Sadia’s marriage to Ihsan105 she experienced 
emotional and physical trauma at the hands of her husband.  She experienced countless 
beatings until she was forcibly ejected from her home by her husband.  After such 
episodes, Sadia and her daughter often sought solace at her parents’ home.  However, the 
physical confrontations with her husband were followed by bouts of Ihsan’s remorse 
when he would make his way to Sadia’s parents’ home and convince her to return.  Ihsan 
would argue that Sadia was dishonoring her family by remaining at her parents’ home. 
This type of emotional abuse would lead to Sadia back to Ihsan. The very same process 
occurred twice before Sadia realized that the situation was escalating and that her well 
being—as well as the safety of her child—was in jeopardy as long as she remained with 
Ihsan. Sadia then removed herself from the violent environment and sought a divorce and 
financial assistance in raising her daughter.106   
Case # 6 Analysis:   
Sadia’s case highlights and brings to the forefront quite a few key issues present 
in Case # 1.  Not unlike Samia’s case, Sadia was pressured by Ihsan to return with him 
because by not doing so, he urged, she would bring shame upon her family.  Such 
urging fell in line with the pervasive idea that an unsuccessful marriage—or one in 
which the female was repeatedly abused—was due to the fault of the women.  More 
important, however, is the reflection in this case of the anti-woman sentiment that began 
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to arise in Pakistan after the implementation of the Hudood Laws.  The word of a 
woman was not accepted by law and, thus, they began to perceived, generally, as 
dishonest and dishonorable   In Pakistan’s case, the state has played a further role by 
promoting such behavior via impactful laws said to have religious foundations.   
Islam and the State in Pakistan 
In the tumultuous years following the Partition, Pakistan has experienced mass 
confusion in defining and interpreting Islam and, ultimately, determining the role Islam 
would play in the affairs of the state.  Consequently, when observing the phenomenon of 
violence against women in Pakistan, questions arise with regard to the role of Islam in 
this phenomenon.  The cases provided above reflect only the small number of cases 
reported to human rights organizations. The following section will highlight the 
connection between the state and Islam in order to shed light on why cases like those 
mentioned above are so prevalent. 
Chapter Three states that in founding Pakistan as a nation for Muslims—but one 
in which all different faiths would have the freedom to practice freely and without fear of 
persecution—Jinnah hoped to create a secular democracy.  As ironic as it may appear, 
Jinnah’s mission was to implement democratic governance while still upholding the 
tenets of Islam.  A Western-educated Lawyer, Jinnah sought to emulate the U.S. in 
separating state and religion while still maintaining Islam as the state religion.  The 
blurring between civil and religious law in Pakistan, however, suggest that his vision has 
not been realized.  Observing Pakistan’s past and present socio-political climate, many 
scholars and experts have argued that Islam has been manipulated for political purposes 
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and defined in an extremely rigid and narrow manner.  Women have suffered greatly 
from such interpretations of Islam.107  
In “Contested Identities:  Gendered Politics, Gendered Religion in Pakistan,” 
Farida Shaheed argues that religion has always been affixed with politics in Pakistan.  
Shaheed states:   
Short-sighted attempts to harness the emotive appeal of religion (to quell political 
 opposition or justify undemocratic measures) by secular actors, the civil/political 
 as well as the military establishment, legitimized religion as political coinage and 
 paved the way for politico-religious forces to assert discursive hegemony.108   
Shaheed goes on to argue that negative consequences for women reached their height 
under the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq: “The mostly politically motivated usage of 
Islam peaked under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), whose ‘Islamization’ policies both 
negated state promises of equality for females and non-Muslim citizens and encouraged 
society’s most bigoted sections.”109 Asifa Quraishi argues that such laws forgo the gender 
equality many scholars of Islam have argued is a central tenet of Islam.  Patriarchy colors 
the implementation of Islamic Law and results in the same malfeasance that many 
scholars argue the Quran warns against.110  Further, Quraishi argues, in prosecuting the 
offense of zina-bil-jabar (adultery) under the Zina Ordinance of the Hudood laws, the 
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absence of four male witnesses has often led to rape victims being charged with zina.111  
Women who are not charged have often been held in jails for unspecified amounts of 
time, often years.112  As it stands, five years after Musharraf’s Protection of Women Act 
entailing that rape would no longer be tried in the Islamic Sharia Courts, there are women 
still awaiting re-trial in Pakistani jails due to original false zina convictions.113   
The 2006 amendment to the Hudood Laws came with strong resistance among 
communities to administer change.  Not only did it go against ingrained custom for 
some, but many object to what they perceived as the state doing away with something 
“Islamic.”  Indeed, Charania writes, “At the heart of the debate on whether or not to 
repeal the Hudood Ordinance was a uniquely crafted space of whether this repeal would 
be an embrace of Islamic principles or Westernized notions of women’s rights.”114  In 
response, Islamic scholars, feminists, and politicians participating in such discussions 
argue that human rights discourse is not an invention of the West, pointing to the works 
of both Andalusian philosopher Ibn-Rushd and Iranian philosopher Ibn-Sina as 
evidence of authentically Islamic arguments for gender equality.115  Such arguments, 
however, have not won over the majority of the populace.  
 Islam has played a vital role throughout Pakistan’s short history.  Chapter Three 
argued that colonized groups often call for a return to authentic religion in re-asserting 
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their identity.116  This is especially true for Pakistan, a nation that was formed 
specifically for Muslims and where Islam was one of the nation’s founding ideals.  And, 
while it was to have been kept apart from state affairs, the years after Jinnah’s death 
saw it slowly being re-shaped and defined according to political interests.  Regardless 
of the fact that all of Pakistan’s constitutions have clearly stated that men and women 
are equal before law, the reality on the ground does not reflect this.  Even with the 
enactment of women’s protection and anti-harassment bills, there exists a strong 
undercurrent of suspicion when dealing with human rights and women’s rights.  
Overtime, anti-Western sentiment has colored general attitudes toward Pakistani 
feminists and women’s rights NGOs working to eradicate all forms of violence against 
women and create an egalitarian society.   
The Shifting Relationship between Religion and State:  the Condoning of Violence 
Against Women 
When discussing the pervasiveness of gender-based violence in Pakistani 
society, it has often been said that while Islam was originally a source of enlightenment, 
it is now used as a tool of exploitation.  In Pakistan, when the degradation of women is 
stamped with something even remotely Islamic, no one questions its validity.117  
Likewise, Critelli argues that the articles within the Hudood Ordinance undermine the 
right of women to be safe and secure by promoting murder and other violent crimes 
while at the same time, eliminating any possibility of state prosecution.118  They further 
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gave rise to anti-women sentiment to such an extent that those women who do go 
forward with their cases—despite the odds against them—are not met with a 
cooperative police force.  Quraishi writes:   
Police action and inaction in rape cases in Pakistan have in fact been widely 
reported as an instrumental element to the injustice.  There is evidence that 
police have deliberately failed to file charges against men accused of rape, often 
using the threat of converting the rape charge into a zina prosecution against the 
female complainant to discourage women from reporting.119 
This type of behavior—coming from those who create and implement such laws—
exacerbates the vigilante justice being carried out in Pakistan today.  Aggressors are 
under the common presumption that their faith and country warrant such actions.  Some 
may argue that lack of education and resources are to blame for such views.  And, while 
that may be the case, it does not excuse the responsibility of the state to adhere to its 
constitution and provide equal protection to its citizens through law.  By using Islam as 
an instrument for political gains, Pakistani leadership has cemented the idea that Islam 
ordains the inferiority of women, and thus, their mistreatment is justified.120   
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 Interestingly enough, Quraishi concludes that crime of zina, as set forth by the 
Quran, is, basically, one of public indecency.  During the Prophet Muhammad’s 
time, accusations of zina were almost impossible to prove because of the 
requirement of four witnesses to view the act without breeching privacy.  In basic 
terms, this meant that four persons were to have observed the act of zina occurring 
in a public domain.  While not entirely impossible, the likelihood of such an 
incidence was extremely slim.  The purpose behind the rigid prerequisites of 
meeting an accusation of zina was to protect women from being slandered.  In 
“Shattering Illusions—Western Conceptions of Muslim Women, “Saimah Ashraf 
similarly argues that loosely hurling accusations about women is greatly 
discouraged in Islam.  Ashraf writes that the dignity of a woman in Islam is not 
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  Consequently, the gross discrepancies between the very narrow interpretation of 
Islamic Sharia law imposed during Zia-ul-Haq’s regime (as well as that which still exists 
today) and the more encompassing interpretations set forth by scholars like Asifa 
Quraishi make a resounding statement.  In failing, as Shahnaz Khan has argued, to 
interpret Islamic law in a broader manner, Pakistan has preceded to condone the acts of 
violence against women.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
something to be taken lightly, nor should one cogitate about her sexual conduct:  
“In the face of any hint of a woman’s sexual impropriety, the Quranic response is 
[to] walk away.  Leave her alone.  Leave her dignity intact.  The honor of a woman 
is not a tool, it is her fundamental rights” (Saimah Ashraf, “Shattering Illusions-
Western Conceptions of Muslim Women,” http://www.islamfortoday.com).   
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When addressing violence against women in Pakistan, many scholars and activists 
stress that Pakistani leadership is not doing enough to combat this problem.  They site 
grave statistics—more that 75 percent of women in Pakistan, in some capacity, 
experience violence in their lives—as evidential support.  And, while the author concedes 
to the aforementioned, there exists another factor within this problematic that bears 
mentioning.   
 Pakistan’s history has been tumultuous.  Much of its sixty-four years have been 
spent under military rule.  Since 1947, it has struggled to achieve Jinnah’s goal of 
secularity, democracy and equality.  The women’s rights movement within the country 
has also had a unique history—thriving at times and completely quelled at others.  
Women were heard loud and clear in the early days of Pakistan’s inception.  However, 
with the passage of time, Pakistani women continued to push for their causes and rights 
but were disregarded by policy makers in Islamabad.  With the emergence of what was 
purported to be Islamic Sharia Law, and the subsequent Hudood Ordinance, Pakistani 
leadership paved the way to a colossal spike in violence against women.   The Zina 
Ordinance led to the punishment of women victims who reported rape, and jails began to 
overflow with female prisoners.  Thus, by way of such laws, the state illustrated to its 
citizens that women were at fault for these occurrences, and hence deserved punishment.  
The additional stamp of “Islamic” on the Hudood Laws only justified state action even 
more. 
 Still, it can be said that, as of 2011, human rights and women’s rights 
organizations in Pakistan have made an abundance of progress in targeting the issue of 
violence against women.  It can also be stated that Pakistani leadership—via the 
 59
Protection of Woman Act—has accepted gender-based violence as forefront issue and, 
therefore, begun to take steps to put an end to the atrocities.  Nonetheless, despite the 
enactment of such laws, the heart of the problem—i.e. enactment of laws discriminatory 
to women and deemed Islamic—has been overlooked and left unaddressed.   
It is not that Pakistan, today, is unaware of the gross violence taking place against 
women; but that it has to contend with the misconception that such action is necessarily 
“Islamically” ordained.  The shifting relationship between religion and state in Pakistan, 
as well as the politically motivated use of Islam, has, alternatively, condoned acts of 
violence and created great obstacles in combating violence against women in Pakistan.  
By taking a more forceful approach to addressing violence against women—as well as 
formulating new legislation in support of the rights of female citizens—Pakistan can 
recreate the gender equality that was existent in its formative years.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Forms of Violence against Women in Pakistan 
Crime Category  Total Number of Cases Majority Province 
Abduction/Kidnapping 1137 Punjab 
Murder 799 Punjab 
Domestic Violence 356 Punjab 
Suicide 402 Punjab 
Honor Killing 382 Sindh 
Rape/Gang Rape 396 Punjab 
Sexual Assault 57 Sindh 
Acid Throwing 22 Punjab 
Miscellaneous 881 Punjab 
Table 1:  The data for this table was taken from the Aurat Foundation’s press briefing on cases of 
violence against women in Pakistan during the first half of 2011.121 
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Figure 1:   
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Ethnic map of Pakistan containing the four major groups—Punjabi, Balochi, Sindhi, 
and Pathan (Pashtun).122 
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